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state wanted that behavior curtailed. Therefore the second
directive given by the state to the Juvenile Court judge was
The judge of the Juvenile Court faces a unique problem that he was, in fact, to act like a judge. He was to exercise
not shared by his fellow lawyers and judges. This problem the coercive power of the state to protect society.
centers around the definition of his job. Just what is ex- These two basic directives, implicit in the legal struc-
pected of a Juvenile Court judge? What is his role? ture of the Juvenile Court, obviously produce a built-in con-
This unique, complex and confusing problem arises from flict for the judge in defining his role. At the same time he
a number of sources. The primary confusion was built into is to individualize justice and protect society. These two
the position by some of the assumptions and limitations goals frequently force the judge into trying to serve two
found in the Juvenile Code under which he operates. These masters.
assumptions and limitations existed at the time of the crea- But apart from this inherent built-in conflict, the Juve-
tion of the first Juvenile Courts and continue to exist today. nile Court judge faces other role problems arising out of
Legal scholars and historians formulate these assumptions the basic assumption about the court. The Juvenile Court
and limitations in a variety of ways,' but perhaps basic are judge, in almost all cases, was trained to be and practiced
the following: as a lawyer. This training and practice prepared him to be
a. That by the 20th century the "humanitarian" view a decision maker in terms of the traditional legal syllogism
had prevailed to such an extent that older concepts of retri- of finding the facts, applying the proper legal rule and
bution and punishment did not seem to be properly applied rending the decision.
to children. But this syllogism is of little help to the Juvenile Courtjudge. He rarely has a problem of determining what are theb. That applying the common law concept of "responsi- "facts" and what is the law to be applied. Many commen-
bility" to all children over seven did not seem valid. Rather tators have pointed out, and properly so, 4 that the courts
an age of sixteen, seventeen or eighteen seemed to be more should be careful in all cases to make sure that the child
correct in terms of the actual abilities and behavior of has committed the delinquent act before it purports to ren-
children. der a decision. However, the Juvenile Court judge seldom
c. That children, as contrasted to adults, were still has this fact-rule problem. In almost all cases the child hasyoung enough that they could be molded and changed so that admitted the delinquency. Consequently, his job is that of
their behavior would conform to the minimum standards a decision maker under the legal rule of "individualized
established by society. justice." Under this rule the judge is a new type of deci-
d. That sufficient scientific (or at least pragmatic) sion oker and can no longer perform in the accustomed
knowledge about behavior existed in the various social "legal" knowledge and training.
sciences and that this knowledge could be used to effectuate
a desired change of behavior in children. Multitude of Roles
e. That the most effective way for the state to imple-
ment these assumptions was to have the state act so "That As a dispenser of "individualized justice," he is forced
the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate into a multitude of roles based on "working with people."
as nearly as may be that which should be given by its In this position he is handed a whole new set of problems
parents...." 2  in trying to define his job and in determining how to handle
it. The new factors fall into three categories. (I) The prob-Specialized Courts lem of the new "facts"; (2) The problem of the judge's own
value system and (3) The problem of the value system of
Based on these assumptions, the various states felt justi- others.
flied in establishing specialized courts. These courts, acting
under the state's power as parens patriae would be able to The Problem of the New Facts
"individualize justice" on the basis of treating and hopefully For the traditional judge, the rules of law pretty well
solve the problem of the facts. These rules not only limit
for him what facts may be presented to him as judge, but
they also define for him what are the legally relevant facts.
The evidence is presented in the court room and it normally
concerns objective and universally knowable behavior.
But the "new facts" are of a different sort. The judge,
if he is to "individualize justice" must obtain an almost un-
limited range of rather strange data. He wants information
concerning the personality and abilities of the child. He
must have a valid picture of the child's environment, which
requires a wealth of information on the child's home, his
friends, his school and his neighborhood.
All of this data is crucial to the problem of causation.
Causation is crucial since the final "new fact," and probably
the most difficult to obtain, is how this particular child will
respond to the various "treatments" available to the judge.
Under the new system, then, the "facts" are not those
obtainable from witnesses in the court room, but must be
obtained from "experts," These experts, be they from the
courts own staff or from outside agencies, are not under any
real control of the court and, since they are experts, the
judge has no effective way to cross-examine their statement
as to the facts. In other words when trying to evaluate the
"needs" of the child and the efficacy of the "treatment" the
judge must rely on other people--other people who, as a
practical matter, cannot be checked.
Although many judges, not having experts available, are
often forced to try, it is no answer for the judge to attempt
to gather these facts for himself. What facts he obtains are
probably not the facts or at least not sufficient facts to
make a proper determination. The judge then, is forced
out of his traditional role as a legal decision maker into the
role of a decision maker whose decisions are, in any real
sense, determined for him by the "facts" presented by an
uneheckable expert. How, then, does the judge properly
define his role in this, at least for a judge, unique situation?
The Problem of the Judge's Values
When the legal system imposes the duty of "individual-
izing justice" on the judge, it is, in fact, allowing him the
widest type of judicial discretion. At best, "individualizing
justice" or even "obtaining a change of behavior to the
minimum societal standard," is but a vague guideline to the
exercise of discretion. Certainly giving the child the "care
.. and discipline . . civen by its parents" is an open in-
vitation to invoke the judge's own sense of values
This open invitation presents many problems to the
judge. His owis personal convictions on such non-legal
issues as the need for personal morality, the importance of
compassion, the fear of naivete', all influence his attempt
to find the proper treatment for the child. His legal con-
victions on such matters as the need for a formalized hear-
ing in order to obtain a "fair" hearing, the efficacy of
punishment, the legal concept of responsibility, and the
obligation to protect society will also influence his decision.
Compounding the problem is the fact that most people,
including most judges, have not consciously and rationally
examined their own set of values and how these values in-
fluence their decisions. And, even for those who have
many values are held on an unconscious level where rational
thought does not reach. The judge himself is the product
of his environment. How much must he unconsciously be
influenced by the way his parents treated him when he, in
turn, is acting as the "parent" to the delinquent child?
Not only do these values consciously or unconsciously
influence the judge when exercising discretion, but they
also may, in those areas where the juvenile code has estab-
lished a criteria for judgment, present a sharp dilemma to
him- For instance, most judges would agree that there
should not be "responsibility" in an eight year old. But
what of a seventeen year old hood? The fact that someone
in the legislature down at the state capitol decided that
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responsibility starts at eighteen probably has but little in-
fluence on the judge who feels that for most children, re-
sponsibility starts at sixteen. Or what of the code's conten-
tion that the "crime" is irrelevant. Can the judge escape
his abhorrence of a brutal rape in determining "what's best
for the child," particularly when, as in some states, be can
transfer the case to the criminal court and when, in all
states, he has the duty of "protecting society?"
The point is not that the judge does "wrong" in letting
his personal sense of values effect the exercise of his discre-
tion, but that these values are one more influence on the
judge and add a complicating factor to determining his role.
The Problem of the Value System of Others
In much the same manner, the value system of many
other people attempts to force the judge into a wide variety
of different roles. Due to the unique position of the Juve-
nile Court judge, he is forced into working with a large
variety of other people. Their value system leads them into
putting pressure on the court to induce the judge to play
the role that conforms to their value system. Consequently,
how the judge handles his job will continually be influenced
by the value system of these other people.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of these
"others" and some of their "values" that may influence the
court might be listed as follows:
1. The Child: What does he expect of the judge? Does
he want the judge to be his "father" and control or even
"change" him? Or does he want the judge to be "fair" and
give punishment in equal measure to the "crime?" Does
he expect and invite the judge to prove once again that he
is a failure?S Do these expectations force the judge in or
out of the role of parens patriae?
2. The Parents: What do they expect of the Judge?
Do they identify with their child and expect the judge to
act like a judge-giving just punishment for the crime com-
mitted? Or do they merely want to be relieved of the re-
sponsibility of being parents and to have the judge take
over? Do they want to be exonerated for this child's be-
havior? "Judge, I have really tried but there is nothing I
can do with Johnny." Do they, perhaps, protect the child
against the alien world represented by the judge.7 How do
these demands affect the way the judge approaches his job?
3. The Court Staff and other "Social" Services: What
do they expect of the Judge? As "experts" do they demand
unquestioned acceptance of what they consider to be rele-
vant "facts?" Do they push the court into the role of a
"yes" man to the probation officer or psychiatrist who
really makes the decision? Do they hope to turn the court
into a full-fledged social agency-an agency which would
be particularly useful since it exercises the coercive power
of the state? Do they hope that the judge will strive to turn
the child into a mature, responsible adult rather than merely
helping the child out of trouble? 7 To what extent do these
pressures induce the court to attempt a more comprehensive
approach to children and/or to abdicate decision making to
his staff?
4. The Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies:
What do they expect of the judge? Do they want him to
exercise more "control" over the children in order that their
responsibility to keep- down "crime" and protect society is
made easier? Do they conceive of "delinquency" as their
prerogative, refusing, consequently, to refer cases to the
Juvenile Court? How does this pressure influence the
judge's perception of his job?
5. The Other Lawyers:S What do they expect of the
judge? Although lawyers seldom appear in the Juvenile
Court, do they demand a more "legalistic" approach when
they do appear? Since they have little contact with Juvenile
Courts, do they ignore the judge leaving him isolated with
his special problems? Do they show their respect and def-
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erence only when the judge sits, as he frequently does, as
a judge of some other court? Do they treat the judge ashaving deserted the "law" when he becomes a JuvenileCourt judge? The values and preferences of this group are
apt to have a profound effect on how the judge sees his job.Does the judge become more "lawyer-like" in order to ef-fectively remain a member of his professional group? Doeshe change his Juvenile Court procedure when there arelawyers present? From a longer range view, does the judgeignore the unrewarding juvenile portion of his job in orderthat he might advance to a "higher" general court with more
prestige?
6. The Community as a Whole: What do they expect
of the judge? Here the values expressed to the court may
range widely. Do some of the community delegate the total
responsibility for delinquency to the court, expecting thejudge to eliminate delinquency from the community by act-ing as an omniscient social agency? Do other members ex-pect him to exercise greater control in order to protect
society? How do these larger pressures affect the judge's
view of his job, particularly in the situation where the right
to continue in the position (and perhaps other judicial posi-tions as well) depends upon the community's vote?
The above list of pressure's illustrates some of the wide
and divergent values held by those with whom the judge
must work. Not only does the legal system and the judge's
own values present inherent dilemmas, but various groups
with which the judge, of necessity, comes into contact alsopush and pull the judge in several directions. These con-flicting pressures point up the fact that the judge is faced
with the almost impossible task of defining his "proper"
role as the Juvenile Court judge.
Although many have written helpful, and sometimes con-flicting, essays telling the judge what he ought and ought
not to do,9 the "proper" answer remains elusive. This is
not to say that a definition is impossible for, a particularjudge at a particular time and place. Many Juvenile Courtjudges have been remarkably successful in working out their
own definition. But all judges could probably improve. Im-provement could come, but it will not, from a change in thelegal system or from a community consensus as to the role
of the judge. Improvement can come from the judge in-
creasing his understanding of the basic conflict of roles in-herent in his job; from an increased insight into his own
conscious or unconscious values; and from an increased
ability to understand and work with "others."
The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges in theirRegional Institutes are attempting to offer an opportunityto attending judges to improve these skills. The Council
has chosen a proper avenue for improving the operation of
the nation's Juvenile Courts.
FOOTNOTES
This article is based on a lecture presentation delivered by theauthor at the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges In-
stitute Il, held at Norman, Oklahoma, February 10-16, 1963.Institute Ill was one of the programs staged under the Council's3
-year demonstration training program being developed undergrant of the National Institute of Mental Health.
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Psychological and Personality Factors in
Delinquency
(Continued from Page 23)
home-life in childhood. As yet there is no generally ac-
cepted psychological theory of the origins of this dimension,
so it is difficult to go beyond these findings.
The implication of the neurological evidence is that the
passage of time is a healer, and that not much can be done
to hurry the treatment up. Since this type of delayed ma-
turity passes by the age 30, the solution might be to exercise
some kind of continuous supervision until people in this
category reached that age. From the socialization material
it appears that a firm supportive environment, probably
involving continucus relationships with other people, has an
effect in strengthening ego-control. Again, this condition
is probably most nearly met in Approved Schools and Bor-
stals.
The Grants found that naval delinquents weak on their
"maturity" dimension, which is probably similar to our
ego-control, responded less well to group therapy than
higher maturity delinquents. They also report the very
curious finding that these people did best with the predicted
worst supervision which was in fact least successful with the
high maturity subjects. Rudoff and Bennett found that
group counseling had least effect for young prisoners who
were high in anxiety and low on the CPI self-control scale.
It seems that counseling and group therapy do not work for
those low in ego-control.
Lack of Sympathy
The origin of this condition is parental cruelty and neglect.
The psychometric findings suggest two possible psycholog-ical interpretations. Members of this group are definitely
weak in social perception, and this may be the source oftheir lack of sympathy-they simply cannot perceive fully
the effects of their behavior on other people, or understand
the disapproval they are producing. If this is a fundamental
cause of their behavior, it might be possible to devise special
training methods to build up the missing skill.
A second possibility is that lack of sympathy is due to lack
of basic social needs, such as the need for affiliation. Thisis supported by Loban's study (41) of 430 adolescents, in
which scores on the Hawthorne test of cruelty-compassion
were found to be related to fear of rejection-usually re-garded as part of the need for affiliation. These needs areprobably acquired in early infancy, and it may be impossible
to learn them at a later age. However, the kind of pro-
cedures which might be useful are to arrange for satisfactory
experiences with the peer group, as can be obtained in group
and milieu therapy. It is worth noticing that this is pre-
cisely the opposite treatment to that recommended for those
with deviant identifications.
